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Cyber security breaches are on the rise globally. Due to the introduction 
of legislation like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
companies are now subject to further financial penalties if they fail to meet 
requirements in protecting user information. In 2018, 75% of CEOs and 
board members considered cyber security and technology acquisitions 
among their top priorities, and blockchain based solutions were among the 
most considered options. Blockchain is a decentralised structure that offers 
multiple security benefits over traditional, centralised network architec-
tures. These two approaches are compared in this chapter in areas such as 
data storage, the Internet of Things (IoT) and Domain Name System (DNS) 








Blockchain as a technology entered the public con-
sciousness in 2008, with the release of the whitepaper 
“Bitcoin: A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System”. The 
paper outlined an approach to online payments which was 
purely peer-to-peer, without the involvement of a finan-
cial institution [1]. This approach would be powered by 
blockchain, which over the last decade has developed into 
a ground-breaking technology with the potential to im-
pact industries outside of finance such as manufacturing, 
education and cyber security. To define what blockchain 
is, the example of a ledger can be used. Fundamentally, 
a blockchain is a collection of transaction records, each 
between a set of two parties (see Figure 1). However, the 
key attribute in this case is that information is distributed 
– not copied – among a combination of computers linked 
to each other. There is no central server or authority that 
determines the correct version of events to the rest of the 
network [2].
Figure 1. Database vs Blockchain Architecture [2]
Traditional architecture on the world wide web uses 
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the client-server model, in which a central server con-
tains all relevant information. This is intended to ease the 
process of updating it and communicating changes to all 
connected computers. By comparison, blockchain is de-
centralised – each computer on the network is responsible 
for ensuring that the collection of records is correct and 
in order. To alter data, the whole network must agree that 
the alteration is valid. With the use of a consensus pro-
tocol (common ruleset for verifying new additions) and 
financial incentive (reward for users who accurately verify 
additions), data stored in a blockchain are trustworthy and 
much less vulnerable to manipulation[2]. There are multiple 
key components in blockchain to consider. These will be 
defined in order to provide context to its potential applica-
tions in cyber security [2]
•Node: A single computer in the peer-to-peer network. 
Each node contains a copy of the entire blockchain ledger.
•Transaction: The smallest part of any blockchain. 
Contains a record of information.
•Block: A data structure containing multiple transac-
tions. Blocks are distributed to all nodes in the network. 
•Chain: A specific sequence of blocks.
•Miners: A sub-section of nodes which verify blocks 
before adding them to the wider blockchain structure 
(verification can be rewarded financially). Once added, a 
miner node will broadcast the updated blockchain to the 
rest of the network.
•Consensus (Consensus Protocol): A ruleset which 
must be followed to enact blockchain operations.
Figure 2 lays out how these components interact with 
each other in order to process a transaction.
Figure 2. Transactions in a blockchain
To observe the security benefits of blockchain, one can 
analyse blocks. Each block contains specific data, a hash 
for itself and a hash for the previous block. These hashes 
are generated via cryptographic algorithm and are in-part 
derived from the first block in a chain. If a single block is 
changed illegitimately, then the following blocks are rec-
ognised as containing incorrect information, rendering the 
whole chain invalid [2]. A possible countermeasure would 
be to simply change all blocks so that each hash reference 
in the chain is valid. However, in the creation of any new 
block, proof-of-work (PoW) must be done by a miner 
node in order to validate the block. For a single block in 
a Bitcoin network, this process requires 10 minutes on 
average. On top of this, each node in the network receives 
a full copy of the blockchain and any new nodes created 
in it. Each of these nodes checks the new block to verify 
if it is correct, and only after this process will the block be 
added to every node’s local blockchain. Finally, all nodes 
jointly create a consensus protocol between them, so they 
all follow the same rules in determining the validity of the 
blockchain.
In summary, the information within a blockchain net-
work is extremely secure and logistically difficult to tam-
per with. To do so would require not just tampering with 
target blocks, but all blocks surrounding them, as well 
as re-calculating proof-of-work for these. Such an attack 
would also require control of more than 50% of nodes in 
order to secure consensus [2]. The strength of blockchain 
comes from its decentralised nature and intensive verifi-
cation process. It is a secure means of containing data and 
therefore has potential in the realm of cyber security. Most 
cases analysed here will be future-facing, as blockchain’s 
role in security is still in the formative stages. The follow-
ing sections will analyse its potential use in different sce-
narios, the merit of these approaches compared to tradi-
tional methods, and whether any drawbacks are significant 
enough to warrant hesitation in technology companies.
2. Possible Applications to Cyber Security
2.1 NASA and Addressing Industry-Specific 
Needs
An example of a major entity actively considering 
blockchain in security practices is NASA. NASA released 
a report identifying risks present in the adoption of Auto-
matic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) by the 
U.S. Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). These risks include 
spoofing, denial of service attacks and more [3]. An inter-
esting observation in NASA’s proposal is the idea that the 
most popular forms of blockchain networks (e.g. Ethere-
um) are designed for monetary applications, and so are not 
ideal for other use-cases. While non-monetary functions 
may be achieved, the implementations often lack flexi-
bility and consistency due to platform limitations. Con-
sidering this, they pursued a more compatible blockchain 
foundation developed by the Linux Foundation known as 
“Hyperledger Fabric [3]. Features that motivated its use in 
addressing air traffic surveillance vulnerabilities include 
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permissioned membership, private channels, smart con-
tracts (Detailed later) and open-source code that may be 
modified to further meet air traffic surveillance needs [3].
Smart contracts are noted as one of the pillars of this 
solution. In principle, smart contracts operate on an “If-
then” premise that Smart contract code is uploaded to the 
blockchain and contract terms and code can be viewed 
publicly on the network. In addition, when terms in the 
contract are met, the associated code executes. For ex-
ample, releasing a digital key to user X if user X sends 5 
BTC (Bitcoin) to user Y [4]. Part of NASA’s solution in-
volves creating subnets (channels) and associated private 
ledgers, enabled by the unique architecture of Hyperledger 
Fabric. This allows for confidential transactions between 
approved members of the network. For a client to join a 
restricted channel, they send a request which is routed to 
it. A smart contract is then triggered which reviews the 
client’s eligibility, the result of which is then verified and 
updated in the channel’s ledger [3]. A notable outcome of 
this approach is that communications can be limited be-
tween approved members of the network. For instance, 
aircraft status (latitude, longitude, speed etc.) may be 
kept in a private channel, while less sensitive information 
(flight ID, origin, destination etc) can be published to all 
approved peers in the network [3]. An additional benefit is 
that authentication is automated via the use of smart con-
tracts. Overall, a useful lesson to take from this proposal 
is that the most popular forms of Blockchain network are 
not necessarily the best for every use-case. Where frame-
works like Ethereum are effective in the area of financial 
technology (“Fintech”), commercial enterprise problems 
are better solved with more flexible frameworks such as 
Hyperledger Fabric. The open source nature of Hyper-
ledger Fabric also allows for further tailoring, allowing 
NASA to utilise the unique security benefits of Block-
chain while not being restricted according to its traditional 
use in finance.
2.2 Data Storage
Many companies operate with a centralised storage 
system for saving customer and business data. This is a 
long-running logistical weakness, as evidenced by major 
scandals such as the Equifax security breach in which the 
data of millions of customers were compromised. Aside 
from the clear implications for public relations, the com-
pany was left vulnerable to lawsuits and therefore direct 
financial damage [5]. A step toward addressing risk is to 
de-centralise data storage so that an attack on one system 
does not compromise every single data record. To this 
end, blockchain-based storage solutions have been devel-
oped and are increasing in popularity [5]. 
According to Xiaoyang He, founder of Lambda (de-
centralised storage network): “Blockchain has the tech-
nological underpinnings to ensure better data security… 
Breaking into an individual block to steal some recorded 
information is virtually impossible at this point. Altering 
or in any other way hampering with a string of data en-
tered to a blockchain-ledger is even less likely.” [6]. Xiaoy-
ang argues two points of strength – The low likelihood of 
data breaches, and an even lower likelihood of data modi-
fication. Before analysing these, an architecture overview 
is required. Figure 1 compares traditional storage methods 
with that of blockchain:
Figure 3. Comparing traditional and blockchain database 
structures [7]
As Figure 3 makes apparent, the traditional method of 
data storage is centralised. If the main server is attacked, 
the entire data set can be compromised – In this sense, 
there is a single point of failure (SPOF) in the system 
which can lead to damaging consequences. Additionally, 
due to centralisation, the owner of the server has full con-
trol over the data within it. Convention in modern service 
markets is not to modify customer data (e.g. Sent e-mails) 
without the customer’s consent, but this is largely a con-
tract built upon market forces and not enforced by any 
specific architecture. Another example of this weakness 
is in the field of research, where important papers may be 
modified or deleted with no trace.
By comparison, blockchain is decentralised, distribut-
ed, transparent and immutable:
•Decentralised: No SPOF. A running service is not re-
liant upon any single computer for its continued function 
or integrity, so attacks on said computer are not damaging 
to data stored on the network.
•Distributed: The database exists across multiple 
computers. The entire database may be replicated on each 
machine, or it may be split across the machines. 
•Transparent: Calculations made to produce data 
results are public and verifiable. Traditional hosting 
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solutions may simply update the result (for example, in 
research, the impact factor of a journal), requiring trust 
between the publisher and users. Instead, blockchain can 
show how a result was generated and uploaded to the net-
work, improving accountability of the data’s “owners”.
•Immutable: In the context of blockchain, immutabil-
ity refers to the fact that data cannot be changed without 
leaving a trace (Figure 4). Old versions of the dataset are 
available for recovery and cannot be removed. This acts a 
deterrent against unauthorised modifications, such as ones 
potentially made by rogue employees in a service compa-
ny [7].
Figure 4. Immutability in a blockchain database [7]
With these attributes in mind, this report can now ad-
dress Xiaoyang’s two main arguments. In terms of steal-
ing information, as noted previously there are Blockchain 
frameworks available which can restrict sensitive infor-
mation to private networks or ledgers. Blockchain systems 
can also be taken off the internet or cloud and placed in 
a local and encrypted environment. At this stage, most 
routes of access for any attacker are removed. However, 
due to the decentralised and distributed nature of block-
chain, even if a node is compromised it can be shut down 
and removed from the network before damage is done [8]. 
Assuming an attacker does however gain access to the 
network and reads information contained within a block, 
Mr He’s point of data alteration being “even less likely” is 
valid. As noted in the Introduction section of this report, 
unauthorised data modification requires time, processing 
power and hardware. A single block being changed re-
quires the blocks around it to be changed too, including 
all associated processing and validation for PoW. Addi-
tionally, for the changes to be verified and implemented 
by the whole network, the attacker must control of more 
than 50% of its nodes. Considering these points, the logis-
tical challenge in modifying data without a trace would be 
immense, especially when attacking large-scale enterprise 
systems. 
Further to his second argument, deterrents against the 
attackers themselves must be considered. One such exam-
ple is their anonymity and the fact that its compromise can 
lead to prosecution (for example, under the UK’s Comput-
er Misuse Act 1990) [9]. The immutability aspect of block-
chain contributes to this deterrent, allowing for any data 
modifications to be identified. Further, blockchain security 
also allows organisations to make data records traceable, 
exposing the identity of whoever modifies them [8].
The advantages of blockchain as a storage solution 
have been established. However, there are two reasons 
why organisations may hesitate at its implementation.
1)In January 2019, a major blockchain security breach 
occurred on the Ethereum platform. An attacker gained 
control of half of the network, and utilising its processing 
power, was able to rewrite transaction history. As a result, 
cryptocurrency (typically immune to forgery) was dupli-
cated and sent to the attacker. While attacks on this scale 
are likely to be expensive (due to the processing power re-
quired), they are possible given adequate financial reward 
[10]. In this sense, blockchain networks are not immune to 
breaches, but they are logistically more difficult to execute 
when compared to attacks on centralised systems.
2)Due to the nature of adding blocks of data to a block-
chain and syncing the updated ledger across the network, 
the rate of data addition can be slow and may not meet 
the requirements of larger organisations that require rapid 
input. However, solutions are emerging to this problem (for 
example, Microsoft’s Confidential Consortium Frame-
work (CoCo) which can throughput thousands of blocks 
per second as opposed to Bitcoin’s rate of ten) [11].
Overall, blockchain addresses many problems raised 
by conventional forms of data storage, such as SPOF, 
lack of data transparency, unauthorised data modification 
with no trace and relative cost-effectiveness of attacks. In 
these ways, data stored on a blockchain network are more 
secure. Additionally, decentralised solutions are gaining 
in popularity and market competition is likely to present 
more options in this area as time progresses [12]. Whilst 
attackers are beginning to make an occasional breach in 
to blockchain systems [10], these are rare and expensive 
to execute. As more organisations consider blockchain 
a critical priority and begin to invest in it [13], it is likely 
that additional frameworks with further security mea-
sures will be introduced, just as they have been developed 
for centralised storage solutions over time. In the same 
vein, while blockchain networks suffer from slower data 
throughput on average, this is a problem that is being ad-
dressed over time by major companies like Microsoft[11]. 
This report argues that the fundamental merits of block-
chain in storage security are strong, and it is likely to be 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ssid.v3i1.3153
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utilised by organisations that wish to protect their data 
into the next decade.
2.3 Internet of Things
The internet of things (IoT) is a term to describe how 
non-living objects (e.g. Webcams, thermostats, door-
bells…) are connected to the internet, and interact with 
their respective networks to automate processes for hu-
mans [14]. The advent of home utilities having internet con-
nectivity potentially creates much value for consumers. 
Despite this, industry growth and user adoption have been 
slow. A major reason for this is widespread concern over 
security, exacerbated by headline news stories such as 
baby monitor feeds being accessed by hackers. Currently, 
the IoT ecosystem is mainly reliant on cloud servers [15]. 
Figure 5 showcases the infrastructure of this model:
Figure 5. Traditional IoT centralised-cloud model [16]
As illustrated in Figure 5, things (devices) connect to 
a local network. In many commercial cases, a connection 
from the device then continues through a gateway to the 
internet, and eventually to a centralised cloud service 
which allows the user to access and control their device. 
The service owner will also be able to monitor its usage 
at this stage, collecting analytics to inform organisational 
decisions.
There are two major security challenges associated 
with this model:
1)Single Point of Failure (SPOF)
Multiple devices are connected to the central cloud ser-
vice at any one time. These devices are likely to range in 
age and quality of built-in security. If a single device is in-
secure, it can be targeted as a “gateway” toward attacking 
the entire network. Possible ramifications include denial 
of service attacks, data theft and remote hijacking of other 
devices. In this sense, each device is a potential bottleneck 
to the security and integrity of the wider network.
2)Manipulation of Collected Data
Organisations can monitor and aggregate information 
delivered from devices in order to inform decision-mak-
ing. They may also do this in order to inform other en-
tities, such as regulatory bodies, about their operations. 
However, apart from external attacks, there are cases 
where data may be tampered with by the organisations 
themselves in order to avoid higher costs (related to 
regulation or prosecution). In these cases, assuming the 
central cloud service is under their control, they can uni-
laterally modify collected records without alerting other 
stakeholders. This is a security issue that can negatively 
impact parties reliant on said organisation (for example, 
customers relying on safety statistics collected by a wa-
ter company) [15].
In order to address SPOF, the commercial supply chain 
involved in creating IoT devices can be considered. The 
supply chain could adopt blockchain, and due to the net-
work’s public availability, devices could be traced back to 
their raw materials in order to determine which of them 
is vulnerable to a security breach. At this point, affected 
devices could be identified for recall and cut off from the 
network. Additionally, to protect against man-in-the-mid-
dle or replay attacks made against a device, blockchain 
signs each transaction using cryptography and verifies 
each signature. This would ensure that any message is 
actually the one sent by the originating device[15]. For Ma-
nipulation of Collected Data, external attackers face a ma-
jor logistical challenge in changing information saved on 
the network. If one node’s blockchain updates are hacked, 
they are rejected by the wider network. If an organisation 
intends to maliciously change the data it is supposed to be 
honestly recording, this cannot be achieved with a single 
actor. Instead, the entire network must agree on the chang-
es implemented. Due to immutability, there is likely to be 
a trace of any such change. It is also important to note that 
a blockchain storage network fed by IoT sensors can be 
an automated system, which along with the base strengths 
of blockchain in verification and shared governance pro-
tocols, further limits the possibility of human actors inter-
fering in the accurate storage of data[17].
Overall, the themes in IoT security align closely with 
those in storage security, mainly due to the use of cen-
tralised structures and the vulnerabilities caused by them. 
Blockchain’s decentralised and autonomous capabilities 
can help address these. Additionally, as the IoT grows 
larger, the consensus-driven aspect of blockchain security 
will increase in strength due to a single attacker having 
less relative influence. This is a desirable outcome com-
pared to traditional architecture, where running costs in-
crease instead [15].
Blockchain’s ability to verify transactions with cryp-
tography helps protect against attacks on devices, and its 
possible application in the supply chains which produce 
these devices can further guarantee a secure Internet of 
Things and improve public confidence in the market [15]. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ssid.v3i1.3153
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Regarding implementation today however, there are mul-
tiple challenges:
1)IoT devices are typically resource limited. Yet, min-
ing (establishing PoW) is resource intensive.
2)Mining is time consuming, yet low latency is desired 
in most IoT applications.
3)Blockchain protocols can create additional overhead 
traffic, which may be incompatible with bandwidth-limit-
ed devices.
4)Blockchain network performance scales poorly with 
the number of nodes, and IoT networks are expected to 
have many nodes [18].
In the short term, these challenges are likely to still 
exist and impede the adoption of blockchain in the IoT. 
However, alternative light-weight frameworks that elim-
inate overhead while maintaining security benefits are 
actively being researched [18] and could be available for 
use by IoT companies soon. If this comes to pass, and 
these hurdles can be overcome, the IoT market can begin 
experiencing exponential growth as consumer security 
concerns are addressed by the new infrastructure.
2.4 Domain Name System
Domain Name System (DNS) is a way for users to con-
nect to a network service such as the web. The left side 
of Figure 6 (from “End User”) articulates the traditional 
architecture and process involved.
Figure 6. Centralised (Left) and decentralised (Right) 
DNS Structures (Karaarslan and Adiguzel, 2018)
The key attribute of this setup is that it is centralised, 
like many other non-blockchain methods. The user deter-
mines an IP address from a domain name by interacting 
with the local DNS server. If the local server already 
knows the address (e.g. It is cached) then it responds di-
rectly to the user. Otherwise, the root servers and top-level 
domain (TLD) servers will be queried for a specific au-
thoritative server based on the given domain name. At this 
point the local DNS server requests the corresponding IP 
address and delivers it to the user [19].
There are four notable vulnerabilities in the existing 
centralised solution for DNS:
1)Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
This kind of attack occurs when a server (such as DNS) 
is flooded with internet traffic in order to disable it. This 
can result in a loss of service for users. Mitigating this risk 
in the context of centralised infrastructure is difficult and 
expensive, requiring an increased number of servers and 
anti-DDoS mechanisms.
2)Server damage caused by cyber attack / Shutdown 
of DNS servers by authorities or disasters
If these events occur, legacy solutions can do relatively 
little to mitigate them. The user must manually change 
DNS in order to re-gain access to web services.
3)Alteration of DNS records on server
This problem can be addressed by the addition of secu-
rity measures and a monitoring process to the server, but 
success can vary based on the admin or security profes-
sional involved.
4)Attack on user to change DNS address mid-ses-
sion
In this attack, the user’s traffic is re-routed to a server 
they did not intend to contact. This can lead the user to 
malicious sites, resulting in consequences such as data 
theft or viruses. The difficulty in addressing this is mod-
erate, requiring end-to-end implementation of the DNS 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol in order to verify 
that the correct DNS address is being reached [19,20].
3. Weaknesses of Blockchain
The architecture of a blockchain-based decentralised 
solution is set out on the right side of Figure 6 and is 
largely immune to the vulnerabilities present in a tradi-
tional centralised DNS structure. The user asks the decen-
tralised DNS server for the domain list it serves, which is 
stored locally (for example, bit and .id). The server con-
nects to a peer-to-peer network of other blockchain-based 
DNS nodes, utilising this to sync its domain records [19]. 
We analyse all four vulnerabilities and why blockchain 
can mitigate against them:
1)DDoS
A blockchain DNS network would be decentralised, 
and as a result many nodes would need to be disrupted in 
order to take down the entire system and disrupt service 
[21]. Additionally, the larger the network, the more secure it 
becomes [19].
2)DNS Server Damage or Shutdown by External 
Actors
Due to DNS records being replicated across many 
nodes, shutting down one server will not affect service as 
the rest of the network will still be active.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ssid.v3i1.3153
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3)Alteration of DNS records
Such a change on one server would require the change 
to be applied to the whole network, therefore requiring 
network-wide consensus. This relates to the attribute of 
immutability referenced in earlier cases.
4)DNS Address Hijack
Blockchain removes the need to contact a central 
authority in order to obtain DNS data. Instead, domain 
owners store their domain information directly on the 
blockchain with a cryptographic signature, and only the 
respective owners can change this information. Due to 
cryptographic signature techniques, the user can be sure 
that the DNS data they receive from a corresponding 
block are valid. The DNS request is encrypted and so at-
tackers cannot easily intercept it [22].
Figure 7. Web access in a DNS-on-Blockchain structure [22]
Another security weakness DNS-on-Blockchain could 
improve would be in the realm of digital certificates. 
When visiting a website, one’s browser verifies its authen-
ticity by checking the certificate associated with it. Digital 
certificates are issued to websites by several certificate au-
thorities, and if an authority is hacked, it can begin distrib-
uting false certificates which can lead users to malicious 
imposter websites. Instead, if website names are managed 
on the tamper-resistant blockchain, then the need for cer-
tificate authorities is removed because simply accessing 
the correct domain name is a secure process in itself and 
guarantees that the connection is legitimate [10]. While 
such vulnerabilities can be protected against, there are 
also disadvantages to blockchain’s implementation. For 
instance, as the network increases in scale, security may 
increase [22] but response times may slow down in turn [19] 
which can impact user access to the web. Additionally, if 
an organisation believes a domain with their name is be-
ing held in bad faith, a blockchain system with no central 
“decision-maker” will make it difficult to resolve such 
legal disputes [10]. This may be a hurdle to organisations 
opting to participate in any decentralised DNS system, 
and so some “centralisation” may still be required.
There are already blockchain-based Internet of Things 
(IoT) frameworks that include layers of access to keep 
out unauthorised devices from the network. Some enable 
IoT devices to send data to blockchain ledgers for inclu-
sion in shared transactions with tamper-resistant records. 
It also validates the transaction through secure contracts. 
A potential barrier to blockchain and IoT is that most IoT 
devices have a limited memory size and limited battery 
life along with restricted processors. Traditional ‘heavy’ 
cryptography is difficult to deploy on a typical sensor 
hence the deployment of many insecure IoT devices. As 
such, IoT devices are more vulnerable to the ‘51 percent 
attack’ where hackers control 51 percent of the processing 
power in the blockchain. This also raises a more important 
point in that IoT devices may simply be too underpowered 
to be part of the blockchain. The blockchain does require 
participating nodes to perform relatively complex com-
putations in a ‘proof of work’. It is necessary for integrity 
of data. Blockchain has the potential to enable the IoT 
to finally provide true machine-to-machine interactions 
with automated price negotiations through smart con-
tracts taking human preferences into consideration. This 
allows us to fulfil the final vision for a true IoT blockchain 
framework, which is IoT nodes verifying the validity of 
other IoT transactions without relying on a centralised au-
thority, such as an IoT device monitoring soil conditions 
validating payments to the local water supply utility based 
on moisture readings. As time goes on, these application 
areas will increase for society and industry, allowing the 
industry to move blockchain far beyond the coin.
4. Conclusions and Future Developments
We identified that traditional centralised architecture 
carries common weaknesses across multiple sectors. This 
is especially noteworthy given that most industries today 
rely on centralised solutions. These weaknesses include 
SPOF, vulnerability to data tampering and vulnerability 
to attacks such as denial of service. Blockchain, utilising 
attributes such as its distributed nature, transparency and 
resistance to tampering offers a fundamentally different 
but much more secure method of delivering cyber secu-
rity. Under blockchain, a single attacker has much less 
relative influence over a network and so must leverage a 
significantly larger set of resources in order to pose any 
kind of threat. The risk of DDoS attacks against DNS sys-
tems could be significantly reduced if domain owners col-
lectively agreed to register themselves and their domains 
on a common DNS blockchain network. The Internet of 
Things, particularly individual devices in the home, would 
be secure and resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks if 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ssid.v3i1.3153
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blockchain was leveraged in that field. In terms of data 
storage, risk of untraceable tampering and data loss would 
be essentially removed under a blockchain method. These 
are just some of the problems currently experienced by 
services today that could be effectively mitigated by 
blockchain integration.
Barriers to adoption include much higher power con-
sumption overall, slower data throughput and potential 
hesitation by larger organisations that would lose influ-
ence under blockchain-based networks. However, in-
vestment in blockchain by companies is increasing year-
on-year, and with that comes the increased possibility of 
new blockchain frameworks designed to overcome such 
hurdles to adoption. While blockchain is not appropriate 
for replacing every single centralised system, and is not 
a “magic wand”, it could bring large benefit to specific 
areas such as the ones outlined in this report. In this sense, 
blockchain is likely to cause at least some disruption to 
the technology industry, and in the end will at least co-ex-
ist with centralised architecture in other fields.
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